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The study offers a discourse-based account of the Spanish copula forms ser and estar, which are generally 
considered to be lexical exponents of the stage-level/individual-level contrast. It argues against the popular view 
that the distinction between SLPs and ILPs rests on a fundamental cognitive division of the world that is 
reflected in the grammar. As it happens, conceptual oppositions like “temporary vs. permanent” or “arbitrary vs. 
essential“ provide only a preference for the interpretation of estar and ser. In addition, the evidence for an 
SLP/ILP impact on the grammar turns out to be far less conclusive than is currently assumed. The study argues 
against event-based accounts of the ser/estar contrast in particular, showing that ser and estar pattern alike in 
failing all of the standard eventuality tests. The discourse-based account proposed instead assumes that ser and 
estar both display the same lexical semantics (which is identical to the semantics of English be, German sein,
etc.); estar differs from ser only in presupposing a relation to a specific discourse situation. By using estar a 
speaker restricts his or her claim to a specific discourse situation, whereas by using ser, the speaker makes no 
such restriction. The preference for interpreting estar predications as denoting temporary properties and ser
predications as denoting permanent properties follows from economy principles driving the pragmatic legitima-
tion of estar’s discourse dependence. The analysis proposed in this paper can also account for the observation 
that ser predications do not give rise to thetic judgements. The proposal is couched in terms of the framework of 
DRT.
Estoy por creer que el verbo ‘estar’ es el 
anarquista más grande, que ha cruzado el 
Atlántico. Crespo (1946: 45)
1 Introduction 
The past five decades have seen numerous attempts to explain the difference between Spanish 
ser and estar – attempts that have been largely unsuccessful in coping with the seemingly 
“anarchistic” nature of estar. Obvious oppositions that have been proposed in order to char-
acterize these two copula forms include “temporary vs. permanent” and “accidental vs. essen-
tial”. Although Hispanists have always emphasized that these oppositions cannot be but mere 
rules of thumb for selecting ser or estar none of the alternative descriptions proposed has suc-
ceeded in gaining general acceptance.  
  In recent years, the ser/estar alternation has been increasingly perceived as the lexical 
reflex of a more pervasive linguistic phenomenon, viz. the stage-level/individual-level dis-
tinction.
1 According to this view, the distribution of ser and estar can be characterized as fol-
lows. The copula ser combines with individual-level predicates (ILPs), which express (more 
or less) permanent or essential properties, such as rubia ‘blond’ in (1a); while estar combines 
with stage-level predicates (SLPs), which, roughly speaking, express temporary or accidental 
properties, such as cansada ‘tired’ in (1b).
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(1)  a.  Maria es    rubia. 
   Maria  is-S  blond. 2
 b.  Maria  está  cansada. 
    Maria is-E tired. 
The ser/estar alternation is then taken as a further piece of evidence for the STAGE-
LEVEL/INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL HYPOTHESIS that the distinction of SLPs and ILPs rests on a funda-
mental conceptual opposition that is reflected in multiple ways in the grammatical system. 
The following quotation from Fernald (2000) is representative of this view: 
Many languages display grammatical effects due to the two kinds of predicates, 
suggesting that this distinction is fundamental to the way humans think about the 
universe.  Fernald (2000: 4) 
Given that the conceptual side of the coin is still rather mysterious,
3 most stage-level/indi-
vidual-level advocates content themselves with investigating the grammatical side.
4 However, 
Spanish ser/estar, as lexical exponents of the stage-level/individual-level distinction, are 
promising candidates for further exploring the interpretative reflexes of the distinction. This is 
the aim of the present study. In particular, I will defend the following claims: 
1.  The grammatical system is NOT sensitive to any conceptual opposition like “temporary 
vs. permanent” or “accidental vs. essential”. 
2. Neither  ser predications nor estar predications display an underlying eventuality argu-
ment. 
3.  Rather than mirroring a conceptual opposition the ser/estar alternation is basically dis-
course-related: estar predications are linked to a specific discourse situation. 
4.  A discourse-based account offers a straightforward pragmatic explanation for the 
TENDENCY of estar and ser predications to be interpreted in terms of the dichotomy 
“temporary vs. permanent”. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a preliminary set of data, which shows 
that a solution to the ser/estar puzzle cannot rely on a conceptual division of the world, how-
ever this division might be drawn. Section 3 provides evidence against event-based accounts 
of ser/estar. Ser and estar predications will be shown to pattern alike in failing every standard 
eventuality test. On the basis of these observations, a discourse-based explanation for the 
ser/estar puzzle is proposed in section 4, which makes use of a compositional version of DRT 
(Asher 1993) with a presuppositional component (van der Sandt 1992). In a nutshell, ser and 
estar both display the same lexical semantic properties (which are identical to those of Eng-
lish be, German sein, etc.), estar differing from ser only in presupposing a relation to a spe-
cific discourse situation. By using estar a speaker restricts his or her claim to a specific 
discourse situation, whereas by using ser the speaker makes no such restriction. The prefer-
ence for interpreting estar predications as denoting temporary properties and serpredications
as denoting permanent properties follows from pragmatic economy principles. The analysis to 
be proposed here can also account for the observation that ser predications do not give rise to 
thetic judgements. Finally, section 5 summarizes the paper and draws some conclusions about 
the nature of the stage-level/individual-level distinction. 3
2 Ser/estar: Some data and observations 
2.1 The  general  picture 
Let us start by having a look at some Spanish data. In what follows, I will be concerned only 
with adjectival predicates because these are the most challenging cases for any theory of ser 
and estar.
5 (See Maienborn 2003a for an extension of the proposal developed here to preposi-
tional and nominal predicates.) The examples in (2)-(5) involve adjectives that may combine 
with either copula form. The (a) and the (b) sentences display a clear difference in meaning. 
Sentence (2a), for example, indicates that life as such is something difficult, whereas (2b) 
means that life right now is somewhat difficult. 
(2)  a.  La  vida es    difícil. 
    The life is-S difficult.  
  b.  La  vida está  difícil    (en estos días). 
    The life  is-E difficult (in these days).  
Similarly, sentence (3a) indicates that the trick is inherently dirty, whereas (3b) indicates that 
the car isn’t dirty by nature but only temporarily. 
(3)  a.  Ese  truco es   sucio. 
    This trick is-S dirty. 
  b.  Ese  coche está sucio. 
    This car     is-E dirty. 
Sentence (4a) makes an assertion about the inherent color of his eyes, while (4b) indicates that 
his eyes have temporarily turned red. 
(4)  a.  Sus ojos son    azules. 
    His eyes are-S blue.  
  b.  Sus ojos están  rojos. 
    His eyes are-E red. 
Finally, (5a) makes an assertion about a sort that the apples belong to, whereas (5b) refers to 
the stage of their ripeness. 
(5)  a.  Estas manzanas son   agrias (porque así fueron cultivadas). 
    These apples     are-S sour   (because this is how they were cultivated). 
  b.  Estas manzanas están agrias (porque todavía no están maduras). 
    These apples     are-E sour    (because they are not ripe yet). 
Besides adjectives that combine with either copula there is a small class of adjectives that 
accept only estar. As the examples in (6) show, these estar adjectives typically denote tempo-
rary properties (see, e.g., Luján 1981: 172f). 
(6) ‘estar’ adjectives:
  ausente (away), solo (alone), próximo (near), vacío (empty), lleno (full), descalzo (bar-
footed), harto de (fed up with), etc. 4
In contrast, adjectives that express permanent properties, like the ones given in (7), show a 
strong preference for the copula ser. Yet, as Luján (1981) notes, these adjectives always toler-
ate estar as long as the context supports a temporary reading, as the examples in (8) show. 
(7) ‘ser’ adjectives:
  discreto (discreet), inteligente (intelligent), cortés (polite), sabio (wise), etc. 
(8)  a.  Enzo es    muy discreto. 
    Enzo is-S very discreet. 
  b.  ?Enzo está muy discreto. 
    Enzo is-E very discreet. 
  c.  Enzo es    bastante chismoso, pero ayer         estuvo discreto. 
    Enzo is-S quite      gossipy     but   yesterday was-E discreet. 
The data presented so far are among those that have suggested that the choice between estar
and ser depends basically on whether the adjective expresses a temporary/arbitrary property 
or a permanent/essential property. This view can be found, minor differences and caveats 
aside, in traditional as well as modern descriptive grammars (e.g. Keniston 1937, Ramsey 
1958 and de Bruyne 1985, Bosque and Demonte 1999, respectively). It has also appeared in 
various theoretical and typological studies, including Bolinger (1947, 1973), Comrie (1976: 
104f), Milsark (1977: 13), Diesing (1992: 44), Klein (1994: 82f), and Feuillet (1998: 724f, 
747), to name just a few. This view has been summarized by Kuno and Wongkhomthong 
(1981) as follows: 
Estar is used to represent a temporary state or condition that does not belong in-
herently to the subject noun phrase, while ser is used to represent an essential or 
characteristic quality of the subject.  Kuno and Wongkhomthong (1981: 101f) 
2.2  Shortcomings of the general picture 
What’s wrong with this view? I will not go through all of the objections that have been raised 
(see esp. Bull 1942; Crespo 1946; Luján 1981) or discuss all of the adjustments to the general 
picture that have been made to cope with these objections. Instead, I will present a single 
example, which I find most instructive because it shows that any explanation of the ser/estar
puzzle that relies somehow on a division of the adjectives into two conceptual categories is 
essentially wrong and cannot be rescued. The example is taken from Querido (1976), who 
suggests the following experiment. 
  Let us assume that there is a botanist somewhere in the Amazon jungle who has just 
discovered a tree of a previously unknown species. The leaves of the tree are yellow. How 
should he report this finding in Spanish? 
(9)    Las hojas   de este árbol     ?      amarillas.   
    The leaves of  this tree    are-?   yellow. 
Our botanist does not know whether being yellow is a temporary or an essential property of 
these leaves. If he uses ser, as in (9’a), he really commits himself to the assumption that the 
leaves are inherently yellow. So, is our botanist condemned to silence until he knows what’s 
going on? No, Querido says. He may use estar because estar does not exclude essential prop-
erties in this context. 5
(9’)  a.  Las hojas   de este árbol  son    amarillas.  
    The leaves of this  tree    are-S yellow. 
  b.  Las hojas   de este árbol  están  amarillas. 
    The leaves of this  tree    are-E yellow. 
Querido concludes that estar can be used to express predications that are based on immediate 
evidence: “estar is the appropriate copula to report a first sensorial experience” (Querido 
1976: 354). A similar view is developed in Clements (1988). I will come back to this later. 
  Querido’s example shows that the ser/estar alternation definitely cannot be reduced to 
any fundamental conceptual opposition like “temporary vs. permanent” or “accidental vs. 
essential” or whatever else.
6 The borderline between ser and estar predications apparently 
does not correspond to any fundamental split in “the way humans think about the universe”. 
Rather, what seems to be at stake is the speaker’s perspective on a predication in a particular 
discourse.
  For the moment, we may summarize the crucial empirical observation relating to 
Querido’s botanist scenario in the following way. If the speaker’s claim is based on fresh 
evidence, estar may also be used to express essential properties. I will call this the DISCOVERY 
INTERPRETATION of estar. This observation will be the starting point for my own proposal in 
section 4.
3  Evidence against event-based accounts of ser/estar
The standard strategy of current stage-level/individual-level accounts is to trace the SLP/ILP 
contrast to a difference in underlying event arguments, in the spirit of Davidson (1967).
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Given that the Spanish copula forms are considered to be lexical exponents of the stage-
level/individual-level distinction, such proposals have also been made for ser/estar (Schmitt 
1992, 1996; Lema 1995; Becker 2000). There are various ways how to implement this basic 
idea, which all make the following predictions (a) ser and estar predications will produce 
different results in eventuality tests; and (b) estar predications will pattern with ordinary 
eventuality expressions. 
(10) Stage-level/individual-level expectation:
 a.  ser ≠ estar
 b.  estar = eventuality expression 
I have argued against a Davidsonian analysis of copula sentences in Maienborn (2003a, b, c). 
My findings as regards the German copula sein ‘be’ were that sein predications failed all of 
the standard eventuality tests regardless of the kind of predicate sein was combined with. 
There was thus no motivation for postulating an underlying Davidsonian event argument – at 
least for German sein. What about Spanish ser/estar? I shall be addressing this question in 
what follows. Before I do so, however, it might be helpful to review the basic features of the 
Davidsonian notion of events.
3.1  The Davidsonian paradigm 
On the received view, Davidsonian eventualities are spatiotemporal entities, consistent with 
the definition given in (11), which I will be adopting in the discussion to follow. 6
(11) Davidsonian eventualities:
  Davidsonian eventualities are spatiotemporal entities with functionally integrated parti-
cipants.
Several ontological properties follow from this definition:  
(12) Ontological properties of eventualities:
  a.  Eventualities can be located in space and time.  
  b.  Eventualities can vary in the way that they are realized. 
  c.  Eventualities are perceptible. 
These properties can, in turn, be used to derive the linguistic eventuality tests listed below. 
(13) Linguistic diagnostics for eventualities:
  a.  Eventuality expressions combine with locative and temporal modifiers. 
  b.  Eventuality expressions combine with manner adverbials, instrumentals, comita-
tives, etc. 
  c.  Eventuality expressions can serve as infinitival complements of perception verbs. 
These assumptions about the Davidsonian notion of events are fairly standard. For our present 
purposes I will adopt (11)-(13) without further discussion (but see Maienborn (2003a, b, c) 
for more detailed motivation).  
  The diagnostics in (13) provide a way of testing the predictions of event-based accounts 
of ser/estar within the stage-level/individual-level paradigm, as given in (10). 
3.2  Combination with locative modifiers 
Let us first test the ability of ser and estar constructions to combine with locative modifiers. 
The behavior of regular eventuality expressions is illustrated in (14). 
(14)  a.  Pablo estaba durmiendo debajo del árbol. 
   Pablo  AUX    sleeping     under   the tree. 
  b.  Los niños      jugaron fútbol    en la  calle. 
    The children played   football in the street. 
  c.  Decenas de polacos hacen cola ante una lechería  (de Bruyne 1985/2002: 318) 
    Dozens   of Poles    make queue in-front-of a milk shop. 
    ‘Dozens of Poles are standing in line in front of a milk shop.’ 
Ser predications show the opposite behavior, in that they do not accept locative modifiers. 
This conforms to the stage-level/individual-level prediction spelled out in (10).
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(15)  a.  *El   juguete es   amarillo debajo del árbol. 
    The toy      is-S yellow    under   the tree. 
  b. *Pilar es   vanidosa delante    del   espejo. 
    Pilar is-S vain       in-front-of the mirror. 7
Yet, contrary to the prediction given in (10b), estar predications do not occur acceptably with 
locative modifiers, patterning in this respect not with eventuality expressions, as given in 
(14), but with their ser-counterparts, as given in (15).
(16)  a.  *La camisa está  mojada sobre la   silla. 
    The shirt   is-E  wet        on    the chair. 
  b. *El    champán    está  tibio en la sala. 
    The champagne is-E  warm in the living room. 
  c.  *Carol está  encinta   en su  dormitorio. 
    Carol is-E  pregnant in her bedroom. 
If estar + AP introduced an eventuality argument, we would expect a locative modifier 
expressing the location of this eventuality to be possible. That is, a sentence like (16a) should 
be able to indicate that there is a state of the shirt being wet and that this state is located on the 
chair. Yet there is no such interpretation for (16a). Even worse, (16a) is unacceptable. 
  Note that when using locatives as eventuality diagnostics we have to make sure that we 
are checking for locative VP-MODIFIERS. These should not be confused with frame-setting
locatives – the latter being SENTENTIAL MODIFIERS. Both ser and estar sentences combine 
regularly with frame-setting locatives, as illustrated in (17). 
(17)  a.  En esta región las  fresas         son/están baratas. 
    In  this  region the strawberries     are     cheap. 
  b.  En Italia, Maradona fue      adicto     a la   cocaína. 
    In Italy    Maradona was-S addicted to the cocaine. 
  c.  En esa empresa, la   impuntualidad era      sacrílega.   
    In this company the unpunctuality  was-S sacrilegious. 
(Mario Vargas-Llosa: La tía Julia y el escribidor)
Frame-setting modifiers do not relate to an underlying eventuality argument, but instead 
provide a semantically underspecified domain restriction on the overall proposition. Depend-
ing on the context of utterance, frame-setting modifiers may be interpreted in several ways. 
For instance, the frame-setting locative in (17b) could be used to restrict the TOPIC TIME
9 of a 
sentence. This leads to a temporal/conditional interpretation which could be paraphrased as 
When Maradona was in Italy, he was addicted to cocaine. The locative frame can also receive 
an epistemic interpretation, though, paraphrasable as According to people in Italy, Maradona 
was addicted to cocaine. (For more details about the syntax and semantics of frame-setting 
locatives, see Maienborn 2001.)
10
  The above remarks on frame-setting locatives shed some light on sentences such as the 
English pair in (18) and the Spanish pair in (19), which can be found at the top of any list of 
SLP/ILP contrasts
11 and which are supposed to show “that SLPs differ from ILPs in the 
ability to be located in space” (Fernald 2000: 24).  
(18)  a.  Pedro Camacho was tired/drunk in his office. 
  b.  ??Pedro Camacho was wise/blond in his office. 
(19)  a.  En su officina, Pedro Camacho estaba cansado/borracho. 
    In his office     Pedro Camacho was-E tired      /drunk. 8
  b.  ??En su officina, Pedro Camacho era      sabio/rubio. 
    In his office     Pedro Camacho was-S wise /blond. 
On the view developed here, the differences observed in these examples do not involve a 
given predicate’s ability to be located in space (via an underlying eventuality argument) but 
the acceptability of these sentences under the TEMPORAL READING OF A LOCATIVE FRAME. That 
is, what data such as (18) and (19) really show is this: among the potential readings of frame-
setting modifiers there appears to be one reading that excludes ILPs as main predicates. A 
temporal reading of the locative frame apparently forces us to interpret the main predicate as 
holding only temporarily. In Maienborn (2003a, d), I propose a pragmatic explanation of this 
“temporariness effect” within Blutner’s (1998, 2000) framework of bidirectional optimality 
theory.
  The discussion of the data in (14)-(19) suggests the following conclusion. Ser and estar
predications, though by hypothesis the exponents of ILPs and SLPs, respectively, do not show 
any grammatical difference with respect to locative modifiers. Both predications combine 
with frame-setting locatives and neither occurs with event-related locatives. That is, both fail 
to pass our first eventuality test. Despite what has commonly been claimed, then, the denota-
tions of neither ser nor estar predications can be located in space. 
3.3  Combination with manner adverbials and the like 
The same picture emerges with our second eventuality test: the ability to accept manner modi-
fication. Neither ser nor estar combines with manner adverbials, comitatives and the like, 
whereas regular eventuality expressions do, as (20) and (21) show. 
(20)  a.  Luis esperaba solo /sin        Carol/pacientemente/ansiosamente a   Dolores. 
    Luis waited   alone/without Carol/patiently        /anxiously       for Dolores. 
  b.  Luchito dormía tranquilamente/con  su osito  /sin        chupete. 
    Luchito slept     calmly            /with his teddy/without dummy. 
(21)  a.  *Las manzanas eran/estaban dulces sabrosamente. 
    The apples          were          sweet deliciously. 
  b. *Dolores era/estaba guapa elegantemente. 
    Dolores    was        pretty elegantly. 
  c.  *Luchito estaba  cansado tranquilamente/con su osito   /sin        chupete. 
    Luchito was-E  tired         calmly          /with his teddy/without dummy. 
Sentences like (22) might, at first sight, be taken to provide counterevidence.
(22)  a.  La   ventana estaba abierta de par en par. 
    The window was-E open    widely. 
  b.  La   caja estaba cerrada fuertemente. 
    The box  was-E closed tightly. 
  c.  Dolores estaba vestida muy elegantemente. 
    Dolores was-E dressed very elegantly. 9
Yet, upon closer inspection these cases turn out to be well analysed as non-compositional 
reinterpretations which are triggered by a sortal conflict between the modifier and the copula 
construction (see the discussion in Maienborn 2003a, b, c). Note, for example, that sentence 
(22a) becomes odd as soon as we replace ventana ‘window’ with cueva ‘cave’ as in (22’a).  
(22’) a. ??La  cueva estaba abierta de par en par. 
    The cave  was-E open    widely. 
That is, widely apparently does not modify a state of the window being open but (roughly 
speaking) the resultant object of an opening EVENT (cf. Geuder 2000). Caves, having natural 
openings, do not lend themselves to such an eventive reinterpretation. Thus, we may conclude 
that the semantic structure of ser and estar sentences does not provide a suitable anchor to 
which manner adverbials could be linked up compositionally. 
3.4  Infinitival complements of perception verbs 
Let us turn to our last eventuality test. As has been pointed out by Higginbotham (1983) in 
particular, perception verbs take eventuality expressions as their infinitival complements. This 
is illustrated in (23).  
(23)  a.  Yo ví a Carol esperar frente    a la    casa. 
    I    saw Carol  wait    in-front-of the house. 
  b.  Yo ví  a Carol dormir en la hamaca. 
    I    saw  Carol sleep   in the hamock. 
  c.  Yo oí   a Rosario hablar con  Margarita. 
    I    heard Rosario speak with Margarita. 
Significantly, neither ser nor estar predications display this behavior: 
(24)  a. ??Yo ví a Carol ser/estar guapa. 
    I    saw Carol    be        beautiful. 
  b.  ??Yo oí a   la  Callas ser/estar ronca. 
    I    heard the Callas     be     hoarse. 
  c. ??Yo ví    al  coche ser    amarillo. 
    I    saw the car     be-S yellow. 
  d.??Yo ví   a la  escultura estar rota. 
    I    saw the sculpture be-E broken. 
These sentences seem to improve when the context supports an agentive reinterpretation, as in 
(25). Consider, for example, (25a), which is adapted from Schmitt (1996: 371). Apparently, 
the perceived entity in (25a) is not a state of Maria being cruel but rather some of Maria’s 
ACTIVITIES that suggest that she is indeed cruel (see Schmitt 1996 for further discussion).
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(25)  a.  Yo ví a Maria ser   cruel (con  los gatos). 
    I    saw Maria be-S cruel (with the cats). 
  b.  Yo oí      al   ministro estar encantado con   los resultados del    programa. 
    I    heard the minister be-E delighted   with the results     of the program. 10
What is crucial for our purposes is that no such additional contextual support would be 
required if copula (or at least estar) constructions did indeed introduce a Davidsonian eventu-
ality argument; and also that eventive coercion is available as a last resort for both ser and 
estar. That is, estar predications are not more “eventive” than ser predications. 
 In  sum,  ser and estar exhibit no grammatically significant differences according to stan-
dard eventuality tests – results which run counter to the predictions of the stage-
level/individual-level paradigm. Rather than (10), the observed pattern is (26). 
(26) Attested behavior with respect to eventuality tests:
 a.  ser = estar
 b.  estar ≠ eventuality expression 
In view of these findings, there is no good reason to adopt an event-based analysis for 
ser/estar; and we can conclude that the Spanish copula forms do not differ from their German 
or English counterparts in this respect. This means that there is no obvious Davidsonian solu-
tion to the ser/estar puzzle. 
4  A discourse-based alternative 
Let me recapitulate what we have seen so far and what an adequate theory of ser/estar should 
account for. 
1.  In uttering a ser or estar sentence, the speaker claims (for a certain topic time) that the 
subject referent has the property expressed by the AP predicate. 
2.  In the case of estar predications, the speaker’s claim is based on immediate evidence. 
3.  If there is no evidence to the contrary, there is a tendency to correlate ser predications 
with permanent properties and estar predications with temporary properties. 
My proposal for the analysis of ser/estar has three parts, which fall within the purview of 
lexical semantics, compositional semantics, and pragmatics, respectively. 
4.1 Lexical  semantics 
As regards the lexical semantic part of my analysis, I assume that ser and estar have basically 
the same meaning, which is identical to that of English be, German sein, and their counter-
parts in many other languages. Estar differs only insofar as it carries an additional presuppo-
sition linking the predication to a specific discourse situation.  
  This part of my analysis can be seen as an implementation of Clements’ (1988) idea that 
the distinction between ser and estar can be captured in terms of the distinctive semantic fea-
ture [±NEXUS]. Clements describes this feature as follows:  
The basic semantic distinction between ser and estar is seen in terms of whether a 
connection to a locus or another situation is presupposed or not. It is argued that 
estar presupposes such a connection ([+NEXUS]) while ser does not ([-NEXUS]).    
Clements (1988: 779) 11
While Clements introduces [±NEXUS] as only one among several features, which have a status 
and which interac in ways that are not totally clear to me, I will try to clarify the notion of a 
“nexus” at least as it pertains to estar in the theoretical framework adopted here. 
  I propose the following lexical entries for ser and estar:
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(27) ser: λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)]]  (= English be, German sein etc.) 
(28) estar: λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)] / [si | R (z, si)]]
In order to give a better idea of what (27) and (28) tell us, I will briefly introduce some back-
ground assumptions motivated by the copula analysis given in Maienborn (2003a, b, c).
  The previous section has shown that copula forms like ser and estar do not introduce an 
underlying Davidsonian eventuality. Based on evidence from temporal modification and 
anaphora, I have argued that copula constructions refer instead to what I call a “Kimian state” 
(or “K-state”). K-states combine Kim’s (1969, 1976) notion of temporally bounded property 
exemplifications
14 with Asher’s (1993, 2000) conception of abstract objects as mentally con-
structed entities.
15 Let us assume the following definition of K-states:  
(29) K-states:
  K-states are abstract objects for the exemplification of a property P for a holder x at a 
time t. 
With this bit of background information we can turn back to the lexical entries for ser and 
estar in (27) and (28) and see that these expressions both introduce a referential argument z 
for a K-state that is characterized by the predicate P applying to the individual x. Estar carries 
the additional presupposition that the referential argument z is related (via a free variable R) 
to a specific discourse sitution si.
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  Before turning to the compositional part of my analysis, I would like to point out some 
attractive features of treating the distinction between ser and estar essentially in terms of the 
lexical differences spelled out in (27)-(28). First, such a treatment is quite parsimonious, since 
ser and estar accordingly display only minimal differences from each other and from copula 
forms in other languages, including English and German. Next, ser is treated as the basic 
copula and estar as the marked variant, which fits well with what we know about their dia-
chronic development.
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  Finally, no selectional restrictions are imposed on either ser or estar, and the two copula 
forms do not differ in argument structure. That is, in principle, both ser and estar can combine 
with any predicate whatsoever. Given this, we do not expect ser and estar to display any 
major differences with respect to combinatorial machinery. And in fact, the eventuality tests 
in section 3 have revealed that ser and estar have the same distribution in all relevant 
respects. 
4.2 Compositional  semantics 
Let us turn now to the compositional semantic component of the analysis. The basic idea is 
that in the course of meaning composition, the presupposition introduced by estar can be 
resolved within its local structural environment.  
   I assume that the functional category aspect introduces a contextually determined TOPIC 
TIME (Klein 1994) or, more generally speaking, a TOPIC SITUATION s*. The topic situation of a 
sentence (where “situation” is understood as a partial world) is the relevant discourse situation 12
to which a speaker restricts his or her claim, the speaker being able to relate this claim to spe-
cific as well as non-specific/arbitrary topic situations (see Klein 1994: 38f). The topic situa-
tion turns out to be a good antecedent for the specific discourse referent presupposed by estar.
Thus, putting together the lexical and the compositional part of my proposal, the difference 
between ser and estar amounts to the following:
(30) Ser/estar hypothesis:
 By  using  estar speakers restrict their claims to a particular topic situation they have in 
mind; by using ser speakers remain neutral as to the specificity of the topic situation. 
In order to develop this basic idea, it is necessary to describe the category of aspect in more 
detail. According to Klein (1994), the semantic contribution of aspect consists in its estab-
lishing a temporal relation between the VP referent (here: the K-state z) and the topic 
situation s*. For our purposes the following simplified picture will suffice: aspectual 
operators are introduced compositionally by a functional head Asp; and imperfect aspect 
(IMPERF) indicates that the topic time τ(s*) falls completely within the K-state time τ(z), 
whereas perfect aspect (PERF) indicates that the K-state time τ(z) falls completely within the 
topic time τ(s*) (where τ maps K-states and situations onto their temporal extensions). The 
DRSs for aspectual operators are given in (31).
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(31) a.  IMPERF: λQ λs* [z | τ(s*) ⊂τ (z), Q(z)]   
 b.  PERF: λQ λs* [z | τ(z) ⊂τ (s*), Q(z)] 
The corresponding derivation of an imperfective ser construction is illustrated in (32). 
(32)   Carol era guapa (‘Carol was pretty’)  (ser, IMPERF)
 a.  Carol:  [v | carol (v)] 
 b.  guapa: λy [pretty (y)] 
 c.  ser: λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)]] 
 d.  IMPERF: λQ λs* [z | τ(s*) ⊂τ (z), Q(z)] 
 e.  [ser  guapa]:  λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)]]   (λy [pretty (y)]) 
       Ł λx λz [z ≈ [pretty (x)]] 
 f.  [VP Carol ser guapa]: λx λz [z ≈ [pretty (x)]]  ([v | carol (v)])  
       Ł λz [v | z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)] 
 g.  [AspP Carol era guapa]:   
       λQ λs* [z | τ(s*) ⊂τ (z), Q(z)]  (λz [v | z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)]) 
       Ł λs* [z, v | τ(s*) ⊂ τ(z), z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)] 
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume (33) as the semantic contribution of the tense opera-
tor PAST. That is, PAST introduces discourse referents for the utterance time t
0 and for s* and 
locates the topic time before the utterance time.  
(33)   PAST: λQ [t
0, s* | τ(s*) < t
0, Q(s*)]   
Applying PAST to (32g) (and leaving aside the semantic impact of further functional projec-
tions for the sake of simplicity) yields the DRS in (34) for our sentence (32). 13
(34)   DRS for an imperfective ser sentence:
   [t
0, s*, z, v | τ(s*) < t
0, τ(s*) ⊂ τ(z), z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)]   
The sentence is true (issues of intensionality aside) if there is a state of Carol being pretty, 
whose temporal extension includes a contextually fixed topic time that precedes the utterance 
time. 
  What happens in the case of estar? Meaning composition proceeds as in (32). After the 
aspectual operator IMPERF applies, the resulting DRS is identical to (32g) except for the addi-
tional presupposition associated with estar.
(35)   Carol estaba guapa (‘Carol was pretty’)  (estar, IMPERF)
   [ AspP Carol estaba guapa]:   
λs* [z, v | τ(s*) ⊂ τ(z), z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v) / [si | R (z, si)]]
This DRS configuration permits the resolution of the presupposition (a) by identifying the 
presupposed specific discourse situation si with the topic situation s* already introduced (si = 
s*); and (b) by taking the aspectual relation IMPERF as the value of the relational variable R.
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Presupposition resolution thus yields (35’). 
(35’)   [AspP Carol estaba guapa]:   
λs* [si, z, v | si = s*, τ(s*) ⊂ τ(z), z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)] 
The subsequent composition proceeds as in the case of ser. The resulting DRS for sentence 
(35) is given in (36). 
(36)   DRS for an imperfective estar sentence:
   [t
0, s*, si, z, v | τ(s*) < t
0, si = s*, τ(s*) ⊂ τ(z), z ≈ [pretty (v)], carol (v)]   
The truth conditions are identical to those of the ser configuration in (34), except that the con-
textually supplied topic situation is required to be specific – that is, the speaker restricts his or 
her claim to a particular discourse situation already in mind. 
 The  ser/estar alternation has often been argued to be an ASPECTUAL PHENOMENON. For 
instance, Luján (1981) proposes a ser/estar analysis in terms of (im)perfectivity; and Schmitt 
(1992, 1996) analyses estar as a stative phase verb. Other proposals that treat the ser/estar
distinction in aspectual terms include those of Hengeveld (1986) and Lema (1995). In a sense, 
my analysis follows this aspectual approach to the ser/estar distinction. Yet, rather than 
claiming that this distinction is aspectual, I take (any) aspect to be the source of the topic 
situation, which, for independent reasons, turns out to be a suitable antecedent for estar’s
specificity presupposition.
4.3 Pragmatics 
Let me now turn finally to the pragmatic component of my proposal, the task of which is to 
explain how an estar predication comes to be restricted to a specific topic situation. What 
does it mean for such a predication to be linked to a particular discourse setting that the 
speaker has in mind? Consider, for example, sentences (37) and (38): ‘The road is wide’ can 
be expressed with either ser or estar.14
(37)  La   carretera es   ancha. 
  The road       is-S wide. 
(38)  La   carretera está ancha. 
  The road       is-E wide. 
Let us assume as a discourse setting for (37)-(38) a journalist’s reporting on the Panamericana 
– say, near Lima. Now, when does it make sense for a speaker to restrict his or her claim to 
this particular setting by using estar?
  Such a restriction makes sense only if there are alternatives to s* in which the predica-
tion need not apply. That is, the use of estar is pragmatically legitimated only if the context 
supports some TOPIC SITUATION CONTRAST (s* contrast). There are at least three dimensions 
along which an s* contrast can be established. 
(39) Potential s* contrasts:
 a.  Temporal dimension
    The current topic situation contrasts with previous or later topic situations in which 
the predicate does not apply to the subject referent. 
    [This corresponds to Klein’s (1994) “topic time contrast” and gives rise to the inter-
pretation that the predicate holds only temporarily.]
 b.  Spatial dimension
    The current topic situation contrasts with differently localized topic situations in 
which the predicate does not apply to the subject referent. 
    [This leads to a spatial restriction. In the above scenario, the speaker restricts his or 
her claim that the Panamericana is wide to the region near Lima, acknowledging 
that there might be other parts where this road is not wide.]
 c.  Epistemic dimension
    The current topic situation contrasts with topic situations that do not allow us to 
decide whether the predicate applies to the subject referent or not. 
    [This leads to the DISCOVERY INTERPRETATION of estar. Such an interpretation 
would be available for (38) if we assume, for example, that the sentence was 
uttered by Pizarro when he set out to conquer Peru and came across the roads of the 
Inkas.]
So, there are various ways to legitimate the restriction to a specific topic situation imposed by 
estar, depending on the kind of alternative topic situations that are under consideration in the 
current discourse. Only one option – (39a) – implies that the predication holds only tempo-
rarily.
  We may now ask how the discourse-based approach developed so far relates to the 
“temporary vs. permanent” dichotomy. How does this conceptual opposition turn up as a 
pragmatic tendency for the interpretation of ser and estar?
  Let us turn first to the PREFERENCE OF ESTAR FOR TEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS.
Assuming that the property expressed by an estar predication holds only temporarily is a less 
costly way of making sense of the s* contrast enforced by estar.
  Given its requirement that tense and aspect values be specified, the grammar already 
forces a speaker to choose a topic situation among temporal alternatives. As such, an s* con-
trast along the temporal dimension is already present, and can easily be activated if the predi-15
cate denotes a temporary property or a resultant state (see note 6). Licensing the use of estar
by an s* contrast along the spatial or epistemic dimension, though, requires additional 
assumptions about the relevant context. In the case of (38), for example, the shared knowl-
edge of speaker and hearer must include (if necessary via accommodation) the recognition 
that a different location for s* could have an impact on the speaker’s claim; such knowledge 
might even need to support a whole discovery scenario. No such additional contextual 
assumptions, however, are needed in the case of temporal s* contrasts. Therefore, a temporary 
interpretation for estar predications will always be preferred as long as the context does not 
push us in another direction. 
  What needs to be explained next is the BLOCKING OF TEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS FOR 
SER. Note that the lexical semantics of ser, as described in (27)/(30), does not presuppose a 
non-specific discourse situation but remains neutral on this issue.
20 Rather, what we find here 
is, I suggest, a typical instance of a PRAGMATIC DIVISION OF LABOR: ser, being the more 
general term, functions as the complement of estar.
  If a speaker chooses ser, the hearer may infer on the basis of pragmatic economy princi-
ples (Atlas and Levinson 1981; Horn 1984; Levinson 2000) that the speaker’s claim is not 
restricted to a specific topic situation – otherwise the speaker would have used estar. Thus, 
ser predications are interpreted as applying to the subject referent in ARBITRARY TOPIC 
SITUATIONS. This excludes temporary properties.
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  This may also explain why ser, although it has the same lexical meaning as English be
and German sein, is more restricted in its application than these forms are. The co-existence 
of estar prevents the expansion of ser’s meaning potential.  
  As for the small group of adjectives that combine exclusively with estar (see (6)), it 
seems quite plausible that their lexical content is biased in a particular way to specific 
discourse situations and therefore that their ability to combine with ser is ruled out. For 
instance, adjectives like presente ‘present’, ausente ‘absent’, and lejo ‘far away’, as given in 
(40), obviously involve some spatial parameter that needs to be anchored in the discourse. 
(40)    *El    artista es    presente/ausente/lejo. 
    The artist   is-S present  /absent /far away. 
It remains to be seen whether this carries over to adjectives like descalzo ‘barefooted’, vacío
‘empty’ or harto (de) ‘fed up (with)’ and how such a lexical bias towards a specific discourse 
situation is implemented. 
  Let me mention, at least briefly, one further co-occurrence restriction that Spanish ser is
subject to. As has been observed in the literature, the ser/estar alternation is sensitive to the 
THETIC/CATEGORIAL DISTINCTION (Mejías-Bikandi 1993; Raposo and Uriagereka 1995). The 
crucial observation is that while estar predications are compatible with both categorial and 
thetic judgements, predications are compatible with only the former.
22 This is illustrated in 
(41)-(42) (where small capitals indicate primary accent): 
(41)   What  about  Pablo?  (categorial judgement) 
 a.  PABLO está ENFERMO.
    Pablo   is-E ill. 
 b.  PABLO es    (un) ENFERMO.    
    Pablo   is-S (an) ill.  
(42)   What’s up?  (thetic judgement) 
 a.  PABLO está enfermo. 
PABLO is-E ill. 16
 b.  *PABLO es    (un) enfermo.  
    Pablo   is-S (an) ill.  
On the discourse-based approach advocated here, this behavior of ser/estar is expected. Fol-
lowing Lambrecht (1994) and Erteschik-Shir (1997), I assume that thetic judgements are not 
really topic-less but “about” the actual discourse situation. Given that ser predications cannot 
be linked to a specific discourse situation, they do not fit into the pattern of thetic judgements. 
Estar predications, in contrast, do. In assertions about the actual discourse situation, the speci-
ficity presupposition of estar is obviously satisfied.
5 Conclusion 
What did the study of ser and estar reveal about the meaning side of the stage-level/indivi-
dual-level distinction? Did we gain a clearer understanding of the real sources of the observed 
meaning effects? 
  In this paper, we have seen good reasons to reject a view of the stage-level/individual-
level distinction as a GRAMMATICAL PHENOMENON with a CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION. Taking 
ser/estar as a litmus test, we ruled out the possibility that the difference at issue was grounded 
in a fundamental cognitive division of the world. And we saw no conclusive evidence of an 
SLP/ILP impact on the grammatical system (registered, e.g., by a difference in argument 
structure). 
  Rather, what turned out to be at the heart of the ser/estar alternation was a specificity 
presupposition on the topic situation. In short, estar is the discourse-dependent variant of ser.
This discourse dependency is LEXICALLY triggered by estar, STRUCTURALLY resolved by 
means of the functional category of aspect, and finally PRAGMATICALLY licensed through 
some kind of topic situation contrast.  
  Thus, the stage-level/individual-level distinction is basically a PRAGMATIC PHENOM-
ENON – even in a language like Spanish. This should (if possible) be even truer of English or 
German, which do not even have an explicit lexical trigger for the specificity presupposition.
  Perhaps most importantly, the present study has offered a pragmatic solution to a persis-
tent problem in the literature: that of relating the ser/estar alternation somehow to the “tempo-
rary vs. permanent” opposition. A hearer’s interpretation of estar and ser predications as 
expressing temporary and permanent properties, respectively, appears to be the “cheapest” 
strategy for fulfilling their respective requirements for linkage to specific and arbitrary topic 
situations. Alternative strategies involve greater contextual support but are also still available 
– all of which suggests that ser and estar are not so “anarchistic” after all. 
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1 The stage-level/individual-level distinction goes back to Carlson (1977) (building on 
earlier work by Milsark 1974, 1977) and has been given an event semantic treatment by 
Kratzer (1995). On this treatment, stage-level predicates are assumed to have an additional 
eventuality argument, while individual-level predicates lack such an argument. See 
Maienborn (2003a) for an overview of further developments based on Kratzer (1995).
2 Throughout this paper, ser and estar will be glossed as be-S and be-E, respectively.
3 See, e.g., Fernald (2000: 4): “Whatever sense of permanence is crucial to this distinction, it 
must be a very weak notion.”
4 See, e.g., Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997: 53): “Whatever the grounds for this 
distinction, there is no doubt of its force.” An overview of the linguistic phenomena that 
have been associated with the stage-level/individual-level distinction can be found in 
Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997), Fernald (2000), and Jäger (2001); see Maienborn 
(2003a, b, c) for a critical discussion.
5 AP predicates have always been at the center of the ser/estar discussion; see Fernández-
Leborans (1999) for a recent overview. Moreover, it is with respect to AP predicates that 
Spanish and Portuguese largely coincide in choosing ser or estar; cf. Querido (1976); 
Schmitt (1996); Feuillet (1998).
6 Our botanist scenario for sentence (9) also provides evidence against the accounts of Bull 
(1942) and Demonte (1979), who take estar predications to denote RESULTANT STATES.
According to Bull and Demonte, estar predications should always presuppose a preceding 
change of state. This prediction is falsified by cases like (9).
7 In this paper, I use the term “event” as a cover term for events proper (i.e. accomplish-
ments and achievements in Vendler’s 1967 terms), processes (Vendler’s activities), and 
(certain) states; cf. Bach’s (1986) notion “eventuality”. See Maienborn (2003a, b,c) for 
qualifications concerning the borderline category of states.
8 When used in the progressive, ser has a so-called “active be” reading (e.g. Carlson 1977; 
Partee 1977; Rothstein 1999). Examples such as (i) suggest that these constructions behave 
like eventuality (more specifically, activity) expressions. Sentence (i) is thus interpreted as 
indicating that Pilar is acting in a coquettish way or as if she were coquettish and that this 
activity takes place in front of the mirror. (In Maienborn (2003a), I analyze “active be”
sentences as grammatically ill-formed expressions that may be pragmatically “rescued” via 
event coercion.) 
  (i)  ?  Pilar está siendo     coqueta     delante      del espejo. 
      Pilar aux is-S-prog coquettish in-front-of the mirror. 
      ‘Pilar is being coquettish in front of the mirror.’ 
  Schmitt (1996) points out that estar never has an “active be” reading; cf. (ii). 
  (ii) * Pilar está  estando   XP. 
      Pilar aux  is-S-prog XP. 
9 I adopt Klein’s (1994) notion of “topic time” as the time for which a speaker intends to 
make a claim. I will have to say more about the topic time of a sentence in section 4.
10 Note that frame-setting modifiers, as sentential modifiers, tend to surface sentence-initially 
but they do not need to. In (i) (taken from Raposo and Uriagereka (1995: 201)) there is a 
sentence-final locative frame, which most naturally receives a temporal interpretation: 
namely, ‘With respect to the time when Bobby Fisher was in Yugoslavia, the speaker 
claims that Bobby Fisher was not brilliant.’ 18
  (i)  ?  Bobby Fisher es    genial,   pero no estuvo genial   en Yugoslavia. 
      Bobby Fisher is-S brilliant, but  not was-E brilliant in Yugoslavia 
11 See, e.g., Kratzer (1995); Chierchia (1995); Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997); 
McNally (1998). In this study I will have nothing to say about subject effects, which are 
another favorite topic in the stage-level/individual-level debate; but see Glasbey (1997) for 
a pragmatic approach.
12 Thanks to Kay-Eduardo Gonzalez-Vilbazo for discussing these perception reports with me.
13 The following representations are developed within the framework of Discourse 
Representation Theory (DRT) (e.g., Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993). See Asher 
(1993) for the compositional DRT variant with λ-abstraction employed here. I use a flat 
notation for DRSs, in which discourse referents are separated from DRS conditions by a 
straight line. The presuppositional component (see below) follows after the slash. The 
general format of a DRS is given in (i). 
 (i)  Notation:    λy λx … [discourse referents | DRS conditions/presupposed DRSs] 
  Variables are sorted as follows. x, y, v: individuals; z: K-states (see below); s: situations 
(i.e. partial worlds); t: times; P, Q, R: first-order predicates.
14 While Kim understood his proposal as an alternative to Davidson’s approach, I think of K-
states as supplementing Davidsonian eventualities.
15 According to Asher, abstract objects (facts, propositions, etc.) are introduced for efficient 
natural language processing and other cognitive operations but do not exist independently 
of them. Roughly speaking, abstract objects exist only because we talk and think about 
them. Asher (1993: 145f) defines “≈” as relating a discourse referent for an abstract object 
to a DRS that characterizes this discourse referent.
16 For the purposes of this study, I adopt the pretheoretical characterization of SPECIFICITY as 
the “certainty of the speaker about the identity of the referent” (von Heusinger 2002: 245). 
There are of course many open questions concerning the implementation of this notion 
both in general terms and in the way it is used here, which I will leave for future work. For 
the time being, I will indicate specific referents with  an index i.
17 For the diachronic development of ser/estar see, e.g., Querido (1976); Pountain (1982); 
Vañó-Cerdá (1982); Clements (1988); Devitt (1990); and Fernández Leborans (1999: 
2421ff).
18 Note that in (31) IMPERF and PERF introduce a discourse referent z for the referential 
argument of the VP. This corresponds to the operation of existential closure in other 
frameworks. As it stands, (31) is suited only for VPs that denote K-states. See Maienborn 
(2003a) for a more general version that also accounts for eventive VPs.
19 Van der Sandt (1992) takes presuppositions to be anaphors that are either bound, if there is 
an available antecedent, or otherwise accommodated. Binding of presuppositions takes 
place as locally as possible, whereas accommodation is carried out as globally as possible; 
see Blutner (2000) for an Optimality-theoretic account of this preference. In the case of 
estar, the presupposition is always resolved via local binding. With s*, IMPERF introduces a 
suitable antecedent for si. For some technical details of the implementation chosen here, 
see Jäger (2000).
20 This departs from Clements (1988), who assumes for ser an opposite feature specification 
[-NEXUS]; see the remarks in section 4.1.19
21 In Maienborn (2003a) the pragmatic divison of labor between ser and estar is implemented 
(among other pragmatic effects on the interpretation of copula constructions) within 
Blutner’s framework of bidirectional optimality theory.
22 This observation regarding the sensitivity of SLPs and ILPs to the thetic/categorial 
distinction has also been made – without reference to ser/estar – by Ladusaw (1994); 
Erteschik-Shir (1997); McNally (1998); and Jäger (2000, 2001). Hence, once again, ser
and estar prove to be reliable lexical exponents of the stage-level/individual-level 
distinction.
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